The unresolved tensions threatening Kenya

Jan 31 2008 Agenda

Making sense of the recent violence that is scarring Kenya is more complex than many might think, according to Philip Amis from Birmingham University's International Development Department.

Kenya and Nairobi are violent societies. While at the national level it is appropriate to consider Kenya as an "oasis of stability within Africa", this has never been the case at the local level.

For good reason Nairobi is often referred to as "Nai-robbery". It is, after Johannesburg, acknowledged as the second most violent city in Africa.

Mugging, car jacking and violence are all common. You cannot walk outside after dark in Nairobi, unlike for example Kampala, Dar es Salaam and Addis Ababa. It is common in Nairobi that thieves are chased by a crowd and killed on the street (think Oliver Twist).

UN-Habitat (the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements) reports on crime in Nairobi are amazingly high and common in terms of violence against both individuals and property. Random and occasionally appalling stories of violence in schools are as periodic as are US stories of gun outrages. This is the "base line" on which the recent events should be considered.

When it comes to settling old historical political grievances, the Luos of Western Kenya (Raila Odinga's ethnic group) have good reason to feel aggrieved and politically marginalised in modern Kenya; this historical legacy made the feeling of having the election stolen from them even harder to bear.

They were original partners in the first independent government but felt that the Kikuyu never gave them their just reward. Raila's father Jaramogi Oginga Odinga went on to fight and lose and election against Kenayatta in 1969. Prominent Luo politicians were assassinated in dubious circumstances:

Tom Mboya in the 1960s and Ouko in the early 1990s. Finally Raila, with Kibaki, was part of the government that took control in 2002 only to feel that his support was not rewarded and the alliance was breached. The Luos have often felt that they were the losers of Kenyan politics and this was the first time they felt they were winners. A considerable amount of the violence comes from this frustration but there are more subtle forces in play.

Some of the violence has been in the Rift Valley, including Eldoret. This is an area of competition for land for the last 40 years. The densely populated Kikuyu of Central Province have sought new areas of settlement and this has predominantly been in the Rift Valley. Some of this was on the land of departing European farmers but increasingly this has been at the expense of other ethic groups.

During the Moi regime (1980-2002) the worst violence - known as ethnic clashes - were around this issue. This is an area of continuing conflict, which is primarily associated with access to land.

This conflict in the rift Valley has also spread to Nakuru and Navaisha and is becoming far more significant than might originally have been expected.

Moving into the urban areas, there is no question that some of the violence is associated with a general "free for all" looting when law and order are no longer present. This is clearly associated with the inequality within Nairobi where the contrasts of wealth and poverty are very dramatic, extreme and apparent to all.

In the failed coup attempt of 1982 it could be argued that the poor were so enthusiastically looting central Nairobi that they failed to consolidate their embryonic coup. There is permanently in Nairobi a major unspoken conflict between the haves and the have-nots. In many cases ethnic categories do not matter; the poor in the slums of Nairobi can see that they have interests with their neighbours - whatever the ethnic group - than with the rich.

Clearly this inequality drives a lot of the violence and the extent to which it takes on an ethnic character seems to be determined by politicisation.

The settlement of Kibera in Nairobi with an estimated 500,000 inhabitants is the largest in Africa with levels of density and the lack of sanitation that are truly appalling. This is part of Raila Odings's constituency and is one of the main centres of Luo Politics in Nairobi. A large amount of the violence in Nairobi has centred on and around this settlement.

Recent research is providing evidence that Nairobi has very well organised armed criminal networks, often with political connections, that are very important on the ground in controlling local taxis (Matautus) and other activities. While their involvement in the recent disturbances have not been reported it is inconceivable that that have not been involved in the recent events.

Any inhabitant of Kibera has many potential things to feel bad about. Some of the violence within the settlement seems to have been to attack local Kikuyus who may be landlords or more likely local traders. This is the internationally common tendency to attack traders and/or shop keepers in such areas. At one level this may be the result of a feeling that the Kikuyu have, through their domination, taken a controlling economic position, but it also reflects in such situations of anarchy a tendency to attack such traders.

Within Kibera some areas are much more highly populated by different ethnic groups and it is likely that there may have been conflicts between them. This has not been directly reported but, given the situation, seems very likely. This economic resentment is likely to be played out in other areas of Kenya.

The final and perhaps most worrying conflict is a process of revenge killing where one group is now attacking another group for previous attacks. This has the potential to set off a sustained conflict. This is the most alarming development in Kenya over the last few days.

The security/police forces of Kenya are also related to the violence. While the pictures on the TV are showing a disciplined police force in action this may not be the only issue. Personal experience has suggested that the Kenyan police/security forces can often exacerbate conflict situations. In many cases it is absolutely clear that the Kenyan forces are often "up for it" in areas of confrontation and conflict. While contentious, my experience would suggest that the security forces are a potentially independent source of increasing violence and conflict.

The final other historical element is that the memory of the Emergency/Mau Mau 1952-1960 conflict - when Kenya in its anti-colonial struggle was in a state of major economic social and economic disruption - may be fading. Throughout the 1960s till at least the 1980s these memories of the 1950s were a very powerful reminder to many Kenyans - especially the KiKuyu - about the risks of "rocking the boat".

The weakening of this memory seems to explain all the political parties' propensity to take extreme risks. An issue in which the Kenyan media has been stridently urging politicians to seek compromise rather than to perpetrate conflict.

So what about the future? The things Kenya had going for it two weeks ago are still relevant: it has a well educated middle class, a free press, a private sector and an economy that is no longer aid-dependent. These are important assets. The question is, to what extent they have been degraded? Even at the end of this week Kenya has assets that many African countries would envy.

The object for Kenya is clear: a mixed free enterprise private sector economy, a bureaucracy free of corruption and a broadly democratic polity.

Almost all middle class Kenyans - regardless of ethnic group - would support such agenda.

The problem, which Kenya has been grappling with since, at least the early 1990s, is to implement this. Paradoxically this present conflict, by exposing the contradictions, may make this more likely in the long run.

* Philip Amis has worked widely in Kenya at the University of Nairobi, in the major informal sector Kibera and for the Donor community in local government, Aid Management and political empowerment.